COUNCIL OF MILITARY EDUCATION COMMITTEES
OF THE UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

COMEC

TRUSTWORTHINESS IN PUBLIC LIFE
NATIONAL RESILIENCE

ESSAYS by Onora O'Neill and David Omand

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TRUSTWORTHINESS IN PUBLIC LIFE
by Onora O'Neill

NATIONAL RESILIENCE AND THE DEVELOPING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
By David Omand

These stimulating essays on challenging issues facing the future direction of our civil-military relationship at a time of inevitable change were received at the COMEC Defence Conference 2017 "Dynamics and Strategy in Universities and Defence?"

Lady O'Neill evinces that the intelligent placing of trust requires true grounds for the link to trustworthiness. She charts the change occasioned by the Great War from society's expectation of a basic ethical notion to ethics often seen as a matter of personal choice. Judging trustworthiness in complex communication can be hard, and professional and legal regulation often fail. The suspicion of experts is heightened by digital technologies, and reshaping practices is required to protect freedom of expression. This is a time of challenge to international order and security, and of misinformation. The moral accountability of the officers of tomorrow, and the trustworthiness of their dealings with others, are critical for the role the profession of arms should play in the future of mankind.

Sir David Omand speaks of the value of, and shares insights into, civil-military relationships in liberal democracy. He adumbrates the breadth of threats in the changing world of national security, which depends upon maintaining a strong collective defence in order to give the public fortitude, confidence in the ability to manage risks and safeguard national interests. Central to this are the Armed Forces as the protector of last resort. However, the leading edge of digital research lies outwith government, and here, as in all technologies and policy, universities can contribute, working with Defence for the benefit of society. In addition, our University Service Units add 'smart power' to national resilience, providing leadership development and nurturing high achievers.

Roddy Livingston

TRUSTWORTHINESS IN PUBLIC LIFE

By Onora O'Neill

If you google the word *trust* you will find more than a billion links, but if you google the word *trustworthiness* you will find fewer than 16 million. Does trust really matter that much more than trustworthiness? Is it *sixty* times more important? Surely we want to link the two, and to place trust in other people who are trustworthy, and to refuse our trust in those who are not. But how can we work out who is trustworthy? Who is speaking the truth, and who will do what they say? For which matters? Is it feasible to place and refuse trust with discrimination in a digital world where content can be disconnected from originators, and where it is hard to tell which claims are backed by relevant expertise, whether supposed news is faked, and where it may easier to rubbish than to check or investigate others' claims?

Polls can't help us to place trust

A lot is said and written about trust, and about the supposed decline in trust. Often people cite the findings of polls as evidence of low levels of trust (actually the polls often show little evidence of decline). Pollsters record and tabulate information about generic attitudes of trust and mistrust. But they tell us remarkably little about trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. They don't try to show whether the level of trust they record is well placed or badly placed, or who is or is not trustworthy in which matters, or how we can place trust intelligently. Polling flourishes because it can be used for some quite different purposes. For example, polling evidence can be useful for advertisers, political parties and other campaigning organisations. It may reveal the attitudes of various 'target' audiences or 'demographics', and suggest what might appeal to them and how they might be recruited or persuaded to vote for a certain party, or sell certain products. But if we want to place or refuse trust intelligently we need evidence that links trust to trustworthiness: and this is much harder to come by.

Honesty, reliability and competence

Our aim in placing or refusing trust is to place it in others for matters in which they are trustworthy, and to refuse it for those in which they are untrustworthy. We want to trust others when what they say is likely to be true, when what they do is likely to live up to commitments they have made, and when they are competent to carry the tasks they have undertaken. So in placing or refusing trust we need to judge whether others are *honest*, *reliable* and *competent* in the relevant matters.

There is nothing very new about this. However we are living in a time in which there is a lot of confusion about ethical standards – although I suspect less in the Army than in some other walks of life. I think what has changed is roughly this. Until the beginning of the 20th Century most Europeans took for granted that duty was the basic ethical notion, and accepted a fairly standard list of duties that included not only standards of justice, but broader ethical duties including honesty, civility, promise keeping and loyalty. Those were the traits of character that families and schools tried to inculcate, and which institutions, including the Armed Forces, demanded.

However, during World War One duty was often identified – perhaps too closely identified – with a certain conception of patriotic duty, understood specifically as matter of serving king and country and being willing to kill and be killed in that service. When the war turned out to be more brutal and catastrophic than imagined that enthusiasm for patriotic duty turned sour and many people turned to a more subjective account of ethics. This is nicely illustrated in W. B Yeats' famous wartime poem 'An Irish Airman Foresees his Death', which contrasts patriotic duty with personal choice:

> 'Nor law, nor duty bade me fight,
>
> Nor public men, nor cheering crowds,
>
> A lonely impulse of delight
>
> Drove to this tumult in the clouds;'

Suspicion of duty became widespread after World War 1 and today many people see ethics as a matter of personal choice: my values, your values. It has become unusual to argue for duty as opposed to subjective preference. Yet if I were to say that my values were sadism and self-enrichment, many people would object – but they would be unsure how to reply. Although most of us are prepared to say

that there are objective standards of justice – for example those that have been articulated as human rights – we often seem diffident about other duties, including duties that underpin trustworthiness, such as honesty, promise keeping, reliability, loyalty. As a result, and despite constant demands that we 'restore trust' in some institution or some profession, we don't focus clearly on trustworthiness. Yet trust is only worthwhile if placed in trustworthy people and trustworthily institutions.

Of course we are most of us are pretty good at placing and refusing trust intelligently in everyday matters. We can often make reasonable judgements about who will tell the truth, who will live up to their commitments, and who is competent at tasks they have taken on. But judging trustworthiness gets hard beyond familiar settings. It can be particularly hard to assess the honesty, reliability and competence of strangers who are communicating complex material in vast amounts, or carrying out complex tasks with large teams. The problem is not usually that there is no evidence, but that the evidence we can find is too complex or too specialised, or is compiled and communicated by processes and institutions whose trustworthiness we also cannot understand or assess.

Regulatory remedies?

These problems have been addressed at great length, but with limited success, in public life. Across the last forty years elaborate legal and regulatory procedures have been introduced into many parts of life to require honesty, reliability and competence, thereby strengthening the performance of the professionals and institutions on which people need to rely, and providing better information for judging others' trustworthiness. That's the theory.

But the regulatory revolution often fails to provide what people need if they are to place trust with discrimination or confidence. All too often regulations demand and disseminate so much information, of such complexity, that those who need to judge trustworthiness are overwhelmed and left uncertain. The battle to improve expert performance and communication with wider audiences has worked in some cases, but in others it has been lost. Often this has been because the complexity of the very remedies intended to improve trustworthiness overtaxes or undermines many people's capacities to place and refuse trust intelligently. It can be relatively easy to judge others' character; it is pretty hard to judge their compliance with over complex rules.

Fraud, fakery and the rubbishing of expertise

Regulatory remedies have been tried for some decades, but we now also find a dismissive and strident tone in discussions of expertise and professional work. This is nicely illustrated by a notorious comment by Michael Gove, former Lord Chancellor, who said near the conclusion of the Brexit referendum campaign during June 2016 that people have 'had enough of experts'. In fact one can tell from the interview on Sky News[1] that Gove had begun to say something more specific, but he was interrupted by a particularly hectoring interviewer. He has since said that he had intended to say that the public have had enough of *economists*[2]. We can all be amused by that and remember the old quip that where there are six economists, there will be seven opinions, and two of them will be Mr Keynes's. But it is the literal and uncharitable reading of Gove's remark that is making the headlines and the running in many political and other discussions, some of which claim that we live in a *post factual* or *post truth* era. Suspicion of experts and professionals is, of course, not new: in fact claims that the professions were some sort of conspiracy against the public or the public interest were widely voiced during the 1980s, and accusations of 'professional cosiness' and 'professional capture' were seen as reasons for shifting from professional to regulatory discipline of experts. But the current suspicion of experts is more troubling, and can't be addressed by regulatory remedies – they would promptly be tarred with the same brush. This is evident in disputes about who is not merely uttering the occasional mistake, inaccuracy, exaggeration or falsehood, but in fears and accusations about pervasive fake news, and in combative and dismissive views of expertise, including scientific and professional expertise.

Trust in a digital world

Is this heightened suspicion of experts a result of our reliance on digital communications technologies? I suspect that the problem is not the technologies themselves, but the disruption to practices and standards for communication produced by their helter-skelter introduction. Digital technologies support voluminous, remote and often anonymous dissemination of material, whose

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1   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGgiGtJk7MA
2   See Fraser Nelson, 'Michael Gove was (accidentally) right about experts' *Spectator* 14 January 2017

trustworthiness – or untrustworthiness – is hard to judge. How are we to tell whether the standards that matter for trustworthy communication are being met in the online world? How are we to tell whether others are honest, whether they will keep their promises, whether they are actually competent in matters where they claim competence?

This is not the first time that new communication technologies have disrupted abilities to judge what others say and do. The earliest case of which we know is very ancient. Plato tells us that Socrates was so worried by the disruption of communication that writing had produced that he relied entirely on the spoken word. Luckily Plato did write, or we would know nothing about Socrates's misgivings: see *Phaedrus* 274b-277a. Socrates's worry was that he did not want his words to go "fatherless into the world", reaching readers with nobody there to explain what was meant or to clear up misunderstandings. The problem Plato had with writing was not because texts can be separated from their authors and cannot explain themselves, but arose from the fact that requirements and conventions such as practices of attribution, validation, authorisation and commentary, on which our ability to judge writing and publishing depend, had not been developed in ancient Greece. Now that those practices and standards are in place we often think of writing as a particularly *robust* and *reliable* way of communicating content accurately and responsibly.

A second wave of difficulties arose with the development of printing. Once again the difficulties were not due to the technology, but to the disruption caused by innovation. New laws had to be enacted and new practices developed in order to define the respective roles and responsibilities of authors, printers and publishers, and to support our ability to tell whether printed material is trustworthy. The laws and conventions on which we rely range from prohibitions of defamation and breach of copyright, from fraud to breach of privacy, from misleading advertising to breaches of commercial and professional confidentiality. It took a long time and many struggles to reshape legal requirements and social and cultural practices to ensure that they both protect freedom of expression and prevent and limit wrongs that can be done by widely-distributed printed communication.

Similarly, I suspect, with online communication. The problem lies neither in the new technologies nor in difficulties in securing technical standards for their use. Rather it is arises from the fact that the legal and cultural measures needed to secure ethical standards in communication have been massively disrupted, leaving

us less able to judge whether others' claims are honest, competent and reliable. Seemingly direct and unmediated – even intimate – online communication sometimes turns out to come from, or to have been shared with, unknown others. Sometimes it is produced by an algorithm. Seemingly professional and expert claims sometimes misrepresent or falsify. Seemingly original material sometimes turns out to have been lifted from others' work. Yet the standards that matter for trustworthy communication, and that underpin the possibility of checking and challenging what others communicate, matter every bit as much for online as for offline communication. There is an enormous amount to be done if we are to make it feasible to judge trustworthiness in public life now that we depend so completely on digital technologies.

NATIONAL RESILIENCE AND THE DEVELOPING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

by David Omand

My theme is about two great professional callings – defence and the academy – being seen together in context. It is a theme to which I respond: my own work has, unusually, straddled a career in public service, in intelligence, defence and security and now, a second career in academia.

On coming down from Cambridge my career started in GCHQ, moving later to spend much of my time in the Ministry of Defence. I had some formative experiences, for example as the Northern Ireland desk officer in the mid-1970s, Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State during the Falklands conflict, and my final posting in MoD was as the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Policy during the Bosnian campaign. That experience of working closely alongside my uniformed Navy, Army and Air Force colleagues made a lasting impression on me, as well as leaving many enduring friendships.

The defence civil servant is in an important constitutional position in the Department of State role, supporting the Secretary of State and his ministers as they exercise civilian democratic control over the Armed Forces through the letters patent of the Defence Council. I recall sessions I had after the Berlin Wall came down with defence ministers of former Warsaw Pact countries explaining how it was possible for us to have both highly professional and well-led armed forces and also have an elected politician, inexperienced in defence matters, in charge. In those days their joke was that the Ministers in their first free governments were either poets or pure mathematicians as the only professions to have kept their hands clean from collusion with the communist regime, the former through principle, the latter through otherworldliness, mathematicians being simply a machine for turning strong coffee into theorems. I was left with an abiding impression that we can take too much for granted with the excellent civil-military relationship we enjoy in Britain and the value that gives to a healthy liberal democracy .

I ended my career as a permanent secretary outside MoD but still in the intelligence and security arena, first as Director GCHQ, then as the Home Office Permanent Under-Secretary, and finally in the Cabinet Office as the first UK Security and

Intelligence Coordinator after 9/11, constructing the UK counter-terrorism strategy named CONTEST, still in place today.

Those senior postings led me to reflect deeply on national security, and when I was coming up for retirement in 2005, I was visited in the Cabinet Office by Professor Lawrie Freedman, then head of the War studies Department at King's College, and invited to join his team as a visiting professor - to do some teaching of the Masters students, some supervision and to give me the academic environment in which I could do my own research. I discovered that you cannot be an academic without writing a book, so I wrote one, *Securing the State,* which is about the changing world of modern national security and the role of secret intelligence in maintaining it. I now have a second book in preparation with OUP, *Principled Spying: the ethics of secret intelligence,* and am writing a third book on modern subversion and sedition. In short, I have been a very happy member of the war studies academic world now for the last ten years.

This experience has, unsurprisingly, given me different insights into the changing world of national security as seen from academia. I would like to share some impressions.

Today we enjoy an unprecedented state of national security in comparison with previous generations who stoutly had to face Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler and then Stalin and his Soviet successors. Clearly we do not face today the existential threat of invasion or of war in the way we did in the past. For some academics therefore hard defence is past history; war studies arguably should become peace studies. I am convinced by my studies on the contrary that our state of national security is in large part because we still invest in maintaining a strong defence collectively through NATO and contribute to its effective nuclear deterrence posture. But we do face other, different, threats nonetheless while the world remains a turbulent place. How does that observation fit with our concept of national security?

My conclusion is that we have to regard *the purpose* of national security as having broadened – beyond the protection of national territory and our democratic institutions, vital though those still are as core missions – now to encompass the safeguarding of the public from serious harms.

By serious harms we can immediately cite the global violent jihadist insurgency with its murderous attacks on the innocent, but also the rising tide of cyber attacks on our critical national infrastructure and the continuing cyber theft of our national intellectual capital.

We might go further and add that if we want national security in today's conditions we have to provide for the protection of national life from major catastrophes including the extremes of natural disaster such as flood, fire, and pestilence and their human induced counterparts – think about the failures of flood defences in recent downpours of Biblical proportions, the fire strike of 2003 that coincided with the mobilization for the invasion of Iraq, the fuel dispute of 2000 that shut down the hospitals and factories, and the foot and mouth outbreak that closed the countryside to tourism. Each of which contingency involved the Armed Forces in protecting the public.

And a sense of national security also comes from the knowledge that we can protect key national interests overseas, such as our ability to trade without fear of piracy, to manage our borders in the face of callous human traffickers and, when necessary, to rescue our nationals from the world's trouble spots.

If you think this is stretching national security too far, and some academics talk disparagingly about 'securitising', just think about it from the other way round: what would it look and feel like if the UK were to be in a state of national *insecurity*, something from which sadly too many countries suffer around the world today.

So I might sum all that up by concluding that in the UK we can rightly say we are enjoying a state of national security when the public has confidence in the ability of the authorities to manage down the serious risks – manage them to the point where normal life can continue and people can go about their daily business, bettering themselves and investing in the future – confident that there will be a future worth investing in.

And by mentioning public confidence I am bringing in an essential psychological element to national security – to use an old-fashioned word, public fortitude. People have to feel safe enough to get on with life, tourists have not to be scared away, the markets have to remain stable, inward investment has to continue in the expectation of stability, business and commerce has to be transacted over the Internet – and thus we see the link between wider national security and economic and social prosperity.

Incidentally, I use the language of risk management, not risk elimination, because most of those major threats and hazards will go on posing a challenge to us. There will be hostile states and terrorist groups, religious and ideological intolerance will create conflict, while greed will drive major criminal enterprises and, if anything,

natural hazards may get worse with climate change. Many of the threats are only kept at bay by our being visibly prepared and determined to defend and protect ourselves, day in day out.

We need, therefore, to recognise just how important the Armed Forces are to that wider definition of national security. Central are the missions that the Armed Forces have to go on delivering to provide the traditional defence components of national security, not least the national deterrent and our contribution to NATO – today for example in Estonia to provide a reassuring forward presence faced with consistent Russian bad behaviour.

Part of that importance to national security also comes from the specialist capabilities which only the Armed Forces possess, ranging from Special Forces on standby, to maritime surveillance and sea control, to aerial observation, and adding in explosive ordnance disposal and WMD protection. And not forgetting the planners dedicated under the Civil Contingencies Act to be able to orchestrate support to the civil authorities locally when it is needed.

I would make a much wider point. When I was studying economics at Cambridge in the 1960s much was made of the role of the Bank of England in maintaining financial stability because it was 'the lender of last resort'. When all else failed in the system the Bank would be there and the government would stand behind the Bank, as we saw in 2008. I see the Armed Services as the protector of last resort of the public.

In the 1970s in MOD I helped set up what today we know as Cabinet Office (COBR), the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. Any time there is a terrorist attack or emergency affecting daily life or a major crisis – (or, rather, a disruptive contingency; Ministers do not like talking about crises!) – then the media tell us that the PM is chairing a meeting of COBR. Incidentally, when we started in the 1970s the existence of COBR and its manual of procedures were classified Secret. Today, it is assumed to be reassuring to the public to be told that COBR has been stood up. Ministers are filmed entering the Cabinet Office to attend COBR – mind you, you know that the problem really is serious when you see the Chief of Defence or the Chief of the General Staff hurrying in to join them.

When all seems to be failing; when the police service cannot cope; or the private sector is overwhelmed; when local authorities cannot function; communications are down; when the public is exposed to danger; and the levers which the Prime

Minister is trying to pull in COBR meetings seem – as does happen – not to be connected to anything in the real world; then we can have confidence that the Armed Forces will be there to step in. That is their role as the protector of last resort of the public. I have seen this many times in person – the Prime Minister, or the Home Secretary or the Foreign Secretary or whoever is in the chair, turns to the MOD representative and asks, is there anything your people can do?

Now it is not the role of the Armed Forces, and the MOD under the political leadership of the Defence Secretary, to take the lead in managing all those risks I mentioned – all the malign threats and the natural hazards. This is a *national* team effort in modern times, as the creation of the National Security Council under the chair of the Prime Minister recognises, a step I argued publicly for. But wider than that, it is a team effort with the community, and with the universities as essential elements.

Let me explain why I say that.

When I joined GCHQ in 1969 on coming down from Cambridge, the MOD employed over 150,000 civil servants including large numbers involved in research and development with major leading-edge research establishments such as Porton Down, Aldermaston, Farnborough, Malvern, Portsmouth and Portsdown, Waltham Abbey, Chertsey, Fort Halstead, West Byfleet, and many others. A few survive in reduced form in DSTL and Qinetic, but today the numbers are down to few thousands of researchers. The cutting edge of new relevant knowledge is mostly no longer inside government.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the digital technologies. I recall when Director GCHQ in the 1990s getting a call from by my counterpart General Ken Minihan running the US National Security Agency to tell me in delight that he had landed a big fish for his technology advisory board. No not from Los Alamos or Oak Ridge but the Chief Technologist from the Disney Corporation. That was where the digital leading edge lay, that was where the big money was being spent, not in government research labs. If we are going to keep up with the new threats then the universities will have to help, across all technologies but especially in areas like nanotechnology, cyber defence and artificial intelligence.

I could make a parallel case in the policy arena, where MOD and the Foreign Office can no longer afford the policy staffs backed by intelligence analysts and historical researchers that there once would have been inside Whitehall. Today government

has to engage, as they say, in 'outreach' to the universities. For example, King's College London, as a major British university and in the top 25 universities globally, is very proud that its Defence Studies Department provides academic support to military staff and command training in the Defence Academy as well as delivering Master's degrees and a Defence Studies Mphil/PhD programme for the Armed Forces, and along with the London-based war studies department, provides policy advice to the MOD and the Armed Forces generally. In short, the universities are an independent but essential element contributing to national security.

Yet there may still be reticence in some university quarters about taking the Queen's shilling to sponsor research or fund places for military students. A pacifist attitude on the part of a few academics, I recall was a feature of the 1968 revolutionary student generation and the debate over Vietnam. Nuclear disarmament during the Cold War provided another argument for keeping distance from MOD. And the recent controversial so-called wars of choice, Iraq and Afghanistan, re-awoke similar feelings among many academics as they did with the general public. But today my feeling is that the more the public comes to recognise the wider part that the Armed Forces play in national life the more obvious it will become that universities and defence are working together by free choice for the benefit of society.

Nor should we overlook the societal value of the leadership development of the individuals the University Service Units (USU) provide. I was glad to read too an emphasis from COMEC on the value to universities of having some students gain a substantial understanding of defence and the military profession, and not simply have an eye to recruiting via the USUs. And they add value to their universities. I observe that USU students tend to be great joiners-in and contributors to the sporting and social life of the university. Alumni magazines love to be able to have interviews with their graduates who have achieved in later life. USUs nurture high achievers in all walks of society.

Universities should also think about the 'soft power' they get out of having USUs.

Neither MOD nor the universities should apply a hard cost-benefit calculus. Government, especially HM Treasury, is often bad at valuing soft power, or as I prefer to call it smart power. It is not hard to make the case that the university units make a significant contribution in society generally and long-term to the nation's resilience.

Let me conclude with a few remarks about resilience. In the period after 9/11 I

worked as UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office. One of the ideas I focused on was improving national resilience, both to be able better to respond to terrorist incidents and to major civil contingencies. It proved to be a very useful concept.

We went through three phases of thinking.

'First-generation' resilience, was based on the engineering approach to the property of materials. If there is an impact on a structure will it tend to bounce back into shape? How quickly could we bounce back into shape after some disruptive challenge? Normality is the strategic aim, for example, of the UK counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST. So how quickly and easily would normal business resume after a serious incident?   Programmes of investment in redundancy and contingency planning helped give assurance that the critical infrastructure would recover quickly from disruption, including in the finance sector.

'Second-generation resilience' is what we called adaptive resilience. This is also about a return to normality, bouncing back from disasters and other incidents, but taking account of learning about the circumstances that contributed to the problems. Recall the July 2007 floods in the West Country: 1 month's rain in 16 hours: a 1 in 300 years event. The flood threatened to destroy a key electricity switch that served the City of Bristol. It was only just saved by Armed Forces personnel hastily building a wall of sandbags round it – the water rose to within inches of the top. Had it over-topped, Bristol – a city of 420,000 people – would have been without electricity for at least two weeks. The adaptive resilience lesson was to be sensible and rebuild it on higher ground. That incident in 2007 was a real wake-up call about the vulnerability of a lot of our critical infrastructure, including these days to cyber attack.

'Third generation' resilience took more account of the psychological dimension. We realized how important public attitudes were. How quickly would confidence return? Would people bounce back into shape by being prepared to carry on, even after a terrorist atrocity. Summed up by the old fashioned but powerful word I used earlier, 'fortitude'. This is being tested as we speak in relation to the public horror at the fire hazards of certain high-rise buildings after the tragedy in London and evacuation of many buildings.

A most striking example of the underlying positive public attitude to the Armed Forces came with the Olympics 2012. I was called in early on by the Home Office

to chair a panel of 'critical friends' to kick the tyres of the plans for the security of the Olympics. I assembled a former Gulf War Commander, a former Assistant Commissioner of the Met, a former Deputy Director General of the Security Service, the head of the main private sector security association and so on. We examined the plans and I chaired a series of COBR meetings to test them against every conceivable contingency.

You will remember what happened – the private sector proved unable to muster the numbers of civilian security personnel when and where they were needed. Sensibly the Home Office had a plan worked out with MOD for the military for help if all else failed. There was initial MOD nervousness – would the look and feel of a peaceful Olympics be compromised by large numbers of uniformed military personnel patrolling and carrying out search duties. Quite the reverse happened as I knew it would – I recognised the military deployment would be a huge success the moment I heard a beefy Sergeant Major bellow at a check point, to cheers from the waiting crowd, "roll up, don't be shy ladies, free body searches on offer".

The big lesson for defence from Olympics 2012 was that the public sees too little of their Armed Forces and likes it when they do. The great Victorian Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel in founding the Metropolitan Police declared that 'the public are the police and the police are the public', that to fulfil their functions and duties they are dependent on public approval for their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect. So it is with the Armed Forces.

That is the context in which I suggest the role and future of University Service Units should be seen.

Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve, CH CBE FRS FBA

Onora O'Neill read philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University and went on to a doctorate at Harvard, supervised by John Rawls. During the 1970s and 80s she taught at Columbia University, USA and the University of Essex, where she was Professor of Philosophy. She became Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge in 1992. She was created a Life Peeress in 1999 (cross-bench) and Companion of Honour in 2014. In 2002 she gave the BBC Reith Lectures on 'A Question of Trust'.

She is a former President of the British Academy (2005–2009), chaired the Nuffield Foundation (1998–2010) and was the founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA). In 2013 she held the Spinoza Chair of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam and chaired the Equality and Human Rights Commission from 2012 until April 2016. She has also been President of the Aristotelian Society (1988-89), a member of the Animal Procedures Committee (1990-94) and chair of Nuffield Council on Bioethics (1996-98). She has received many honorary degrees and other honours in Britain, Austria, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and the USA.

Professor Sir David Omand, GCB

A graduate of Cambridge, Sir David began his career with the Government Communications Headquarters GCHQ. After working for the Ministry of Defence for a number of years, Omand was appointed Director of GCHQ from 1996 to 1997. His next post was Permanent Secretary at the Home Office. In 2002 he became the first UK Security and Intelligence Co-Ordinator as a Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office.

Retiring in 2005, he became a visiting Professor in the War Studies Department at King's College London. He also teaches intelligence studies at Sciences Po in Paris. His book 2010 *Securing the State* is to be followed in 2018 by *Principled Spying: The Ethics of Secret Intelligence*. He is Vice-President of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) and is the Senior Independent Director of Babcock International Group plc and sits on the advisory board of Paladin Capital, investing in cyber-security start-ups.